The Rail Accident Investigation Branch has released its initial findings into the train crash in Powys.
On Monday 21st October 2024, 1J25 18:31 Shrewsbury to Aberystwyth service collided with the 19:09 Machynlleth to Shrewsbury service just outside of Talerddig loop in Powys.
1 person died and four others were seriously injured in the collision, with 11 others needing hospital treatment.
Over the days after the collision, the RAIB worked to investigate the collision, before releasing the site and trains back to Network Rail on Wednesday 23rd October.
The preliminary examination has found that 1J25 had been scheduled to stop at Talerddig loop to let 1S71 pass, and the driver of the train correctly applied service braking on the approach to the loop.
However, after around 40 seconds after the first brake application, the On Train Data Recorder recorded an emergency brake demand being made.
This demand remained in place until the collision took place.
The RAIB says that there is conflicting evidence relating to the speed of the trains before impact but says initial analysis says that 1J25 was travelling at between 15 and 24 mph and 1S71 was travelling at around 6mph.
Investigations have found that at various locations on the approach to Talerddig loop, the rail adhesion levels were low, and an inspection of the sanding equipment fitted to 1J25 found the hoses to be blocked and unable to discharge sand.
The RAIB has therefore said that its full investigation will consider the following points:
- the actions of those involved and any factors that may have influenced them
- the level of wheel/rail adhesion present from the approach to Talerddig loop to the point of collision
- the status and performance of the braking, wheel slide protection and sanding systems on train 1J25
- the behaviour of both trains during and following the collision
- Transport for Wales‘ policies relating to low wheel/rail adhesion and how it managed the risk of low adhesion on the Cambrian line
- Network Rail’s policies relating to low wheel/rail adhesion and how it managed the risk of low adhesion on the Cambrian line
- the processes used to assess and control the risk of overrun on the Cambrian line
- any relevant underlying factors, including any actions taken in response to previous relevant safety recommendations.
Responses
One would suggest some on board monitoring equipment during low/poor rail adhesion conditions to the stock, and instructive training for drivers on how to regain braking control Stock allowing?
I presume the up train was in the loop under a red signal, if this were the case surely the down train would have passed by, the points being set correctly for this. I expect I may have missed something on this.
The up train never got as far as the loop. The Down train slipped through the loop and out of the other end onto the single line. There are no lineside signals as the trains on that line have in-cab signalling.
Yes, you have fundamentally mis understood the accident and the specific location of the collision.