The Rail Accident Investigation Branch has released its first full statement following yesterday’s train collision on the Cambrian Line.
They have said that their investigation is in the very early stages but have released some pieces of information.
At around 19:26 on the 21st of October 2024, the 18:31 Shrewsbury to Aberystwyth service collided with another train (the 19:09 Machynlleth – Shrewsbury service) on the Cambrian Line approximately 800 metres beyond Talerddig Loop in Powys.
Early evidence suggests that the collision occurred at around 15 mph.
The incident left one person dead and four others with serious injuries that needed hospital treatment.
RAIB staff have worked with the ORR and British Transport Police today to gather evidence, including the black box data recorder.
The initial inspection of the track showed evidence of low rail adhesion, suggesting the train may have been wheel sliding when braking but this is subject to an ongoing investigation.
The full statement is below
At around 19:26 on the evening of 21 October 2024, the 18:31 Transport for Wales passenger service from Shrewsbury to Aberystwyth collided with another train on Network Rail‘s Cambrian line, approximately 800 metres west of the passing loop located at Talerddig, Powys. Initial evidence suggests that collision occurred at a speed of approximately 24 km/h (15 mph). The second train involved was the 19:09 Machynlleth to Shrewsbury passenger service, also operated by Transport for Wales.
One passenger tragically died and four other people were seriously injured. Eleven more people sustained injuries which required hospital treatment.
RAIB was notified of the accident at 19:45 on the night of the accident and immediately dispatched a team of inspectors to examine the site and collect evidence.
Additional RAIB staff and specialist equipment have arrived at the site of the accident throughout today and we continue to work in conjunction with the British Transport Police, the Office of Rail and Road and the railway companies involved to secure the necessary evidence to support our independent safety investigation. This will include examining the condition of the train and downloading its ‘black box’ data recorder, inspecting the track, analysing data from railway signalling and radio systems, and interviewing witnesses.
The railway approaching Talerddig from each direction consists of a single track. To allow trains to pass each other a track loop is provided. These loops have points at each end and allow trains to enter a short length of track which lies alongside the single line.
RAIB’s initial inspection of the track on approach to the point of collision found evidence that wheel/rail adhesion was relatively low, suggesting that the train may have entered into wheel slide when braking. This will be an area of ongoing investigation. Our investigation is in its very early stages and an additional update will be available in the coming days once RAIB has gathered and analysed further evidence.
Responses
Such a slide seems probable to me, from experience with modern units in low adhesion conditions. The WSP releases and re-applies the brakes, at times the brakes are all effectively released for short periods. As a DM I had some involvement in dealing with incidents which involved long overruns, fortunately nothing was in the way.
My impression of RAIB report is that the wheels picking up or skid was the result of the two trains suddenly confronting each other on the same (Single line)! A panic emergency stop! The loop was 800 metres back? (What’s that in English? 1/2 mile)? Some skid that would be! Catch points, Trap points whatever? Shouldn’t allow two trains on a single line working! Never a problem with the token or tablet! Points set for that very accident to be deemed impossible to happen! Bung in some telescopic buffers on the loop! Rule 55, Safety of trains on running lines! My old driver would expect me to sing out our line section! Ok! he would sing! Bit like todays airline captain landing at Heathrow! Co pilot sings out undercarriage down captain! — Check sings captain!! (Complete co worker transparency) Stick a stiff nylon brush on leading wheels guide bar? Or a small sand box for emergency stops! Theyve a bit of compressed air somewhere going spare?
I hasten to add my condolences to the family of the deceased!
Surely what we need nationwide is for Network Rail to cut back/prune line side vegetation which has been allowed to grow exponentially.
This is not that far from the the location of the Abermule head on crash of 1921. That left 17 dead. In the days of brake blocks the block would scrape any detritus from the wheel … another case of technology being too clever by half for the sake of little, if any, real gain.
If this was a low adhesion issue a very old-tech technique comes to mind, the sand box. Fitting them to DMUs might be tricky but at this time of year there’s a need for a solution to the leafy issue. Didn’t the collision at Salisbury a year or two ago illustrate that this is not a one-off event?
The water jet train has come to be the solution for treating leaf mould build up. My question would be whether it had operated that day. Throwing sand around the track causes other problems!
Strange that no such accident occurred during steam days when a physical exchange of a token was carried out before entering the next section.
It has not been suggested that the westbound train intentionally left without the token. No token system solves an adhesion issue.
It did. Abermule. And having the token doesn’t stop wheel slide.
In the 21st Century, how is this possible? Transport safety in this country is 3rd world.
You’re talking complete rubbish. Transport safety in the UK, especially rail, is second to none.
I wonder when the water jet train treated that section of line – was it timetabled to run every day?
Friday 18th October
My front garden is evidence enough. Heavy leaf fall can happen in a short space of time.
At least this is nothing to do with the ECTS experiment on the Cambrian Coast line.
It looks almost obvious that the train descending Talerdigg picked its wheels up and slid straight through the loop into the approaching up train climbing up the single line from Macchynlleth below the loop, a shocking tragedy and one where the twin effects of disc brakes that clean neither railhead nor wheel treads and the possibly unique effects of Storm Ashley may have both played a part.
I don’t think that catch points below the loop are an answer as that merely sends trains down the bank. Perhaps there is a role for the old sandite trains with heavy axle load loco haulage and perhaps the ORR may care to give their attention to real accident risks instead of aiming for easy targets like CDL
lets face it – we now know that permanent way can kill! And what a tragedy that the line that saw Abermule may once again have a role to play in railway safety.
Catch points? I think you mean Trap points. They did away with catch points years ago.
Surely if the points had been set to send one of the units into the passing loop then, low track adhesion or not, the collision would not have occurred…?
They were set for the loop, the train was trying to stop in it but ended up passing the signal back onto the single line. Your understanding of this is lacking.
There are no lineside signals on that line. The trains have in-cab signalling.
It did go into the passing loop but slid out the other end into the train approaching the loop
Unless it was going from the loop into the single track and pushed the points over
Regardless of who they eventually “blame”, the main problem is single line / bi-directional track. That was done on purpose with a known risk factor.
Should we double the entire Cambrian route then? Go find the cash for that one, if you can!