The Rail Accident Investigation Branch has released its report into a collision between on-track machines back in 2023.

On the 16th of November 2023, at around 04:15, the machine driver was injured when trying to couple a multi-purpose to a tamper on High Speed 1 near Strood in Kent.

The driver was injured when the stationary tamper was struck and moved by a second MPV at around 12mph.

The second MPV was being driven towards the tamper with the intention of coupling all vehicles together at the end of a night shift.

In the investigation, it was found that it had become practice to couple the vehicles together. Normally, this involves the approaching vehicle coming to a stand around 50-100 metres away before the driver then moves up at low speed to complete the coupling operation.

However, on this occasion, the vehicle didn’t come to a stop at the holding point, this was due to the driver not having a view of the railway in the direction of travel but was instead reliant on radio messages from the machine controller at the rear of the vehicle.

On the night of the incident, the radio that was being used developed an intermittent fault, but because of the design of the radio, neither the driver nor controller knew contact had been lost.

The controller did subsequently realise the radio was not working, so shouted to brake, but this was too late to avoid a collision.

The RAIB found that the radios being used did not transmit a ‘confidence tone’ which would have alerted staff to a loss in communications.

The investigation also found that the MPVs on HS1 were not fitted with any facility for the controller to ride on the rear deck to brake the vehicle, something that was recommended following a similar accident in 2021.

Since this accident, Network Rail High Speed has fitted its fleet with an emergency stop button adjacent to the rear deck, and secure communication systems and is due to install a rear-facing camera which is connected to an in-cab monitor.

RAIB has made four recommendations. The first three are addressed to Network Rail High Speed and the fourth to HS1 Ltd.

The first recommendation aims to control the risks of engineering vehicle operation on HS1, while the second looks to keep staff working on the line safe by implementing a robust procedural framework.

The third recommendation is that Network Rail High Speed ensures that internal recommendations and local actions are reviewed and implemented in a way that reflects their intent, and in a way that can be tracked and used to support safety decision‑making.

The final recommendation is for HS1 Ltd to exercise more effective strategic safety assurance of its suppliers.