The Rail Accident Investigation Branch has released its report on the incident at Aviemore involving Flying Scotsman.
At around 18:05 on Friday 29th September 2023, Flying Scotsman was travelling tender first and collided with Royal Scotsman coaches at Aviemore station on the Strathspey Railway.
The coaches normally operate on the mainline but were due to be hauled by Flying Scotsman on the Strathspey Railway as part of a planned movement to Boat of Garten station.
The collision occurred during a coupling movement at around 7 mph.
Two people were taken to hospital as a consequence of the accident, which also caused minor damage to the locomotive’s tender and damage to the coaches which were taken out of service.
The RAIB has found that the collision occurred because the driver was not aware of the locomotive’s location compared to the coaches and did not slow his speed accordingly.
This was found to be due to the driver’s view of the track ahead being limited and immediately before the collision, no one in the cab warned the driver of the approaching coaches.
The driver was found to be expecting the coaches to be located further away from the approaching locomotive.
The Rail Accident Investigation Branch also says that the Strathspey Railway Company’s ‘ineffective management’ of the visit of Flying Scotsman to the railway was identified as an underlying factor.
RAIB has made one recommendation. It is addressed to the Strathspey Railway Company and relates to a review of the arrangements for foreseeable abnormal operations, such as visiting railway vehicles and special events, to ensure that the risks are identified, assessed and mitigated.
RAIB has identified two learning points. The first is a reminder of the importance of train crew maintaining an effective lookout while driving on a line-of-sight basis and knowing who is responsible for maintaining that lookout.
The second is the importance of complying with rules regarding the number of people in a locomotive cab and ensuring that roles during movements are clearly understood.
Responses
I have noticed a number of heritage lines where the loco moves slowly but without stopping before buffer contact; on most (if not all) main-line operations the loco or unit is required to stop approx 6’ or 2 meters short before the final coupling move. Could heritage not copy?
I would have that stopping short at 2m would be the prevailing practice for all heritage lines, i’m an employee with a TOC, and any attachment where that proceedure is not followed is now called a collision, and is reported as such.
Where was the shunter, in the overloaded cab. In my humble opinion WCRC should take some of the blame
Where and what was the shunter doing?
What do you mean there wasn’t a shunter……
At what point does “ineffective management” become negligent?
This seems overly complicated. This manoeuvre should have employed a ground shunter with sight of it all to provide instructions to the driver of the locomotive. Failure to have that in place meant the driver was carrying out a blind manoeuvre with obvious consequences.
Well said