The Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB) has today released its report into a near miss at Farnborough North footpath level crossing in May last year.

At 8.30am on Thursday 19 May 2022, 144 people were on the east side of the railway, waiting to use the footpath level crossing at Farnborough North station in Hampshire.

There are pedestrian gates on each side of the crossing, which were locked until the train that these passengers had arrived on had departed from the station. The people waiting to use the crossing were mostly young school and college students.

They were regular users of the station, and were used to having to wait before crossing the railway to continue their journey. The station does not have a subway or footbridge, so the level crossing is the only way to get from one side to the other.

Once the train had departed, miniature stop lights at the crossing changed from red to green and an audible warning stopped, indicating to pedestrians that it was safe for them to cross the railway. A crossing attendant was located in a cabin next to the crossing on the east side, and responded by turning a switch to remotely unlock the pedestrian gates at both ends of the crossing.

The person at the front of the queue opened the gate, and the group began to cross the railway. Each person held the gate open for the person following them.

After around half the group had crossed, another train approached the crossing. The miniature stop lights changed from green to red and the audible warning started. The crossing attendant turned the switch to lock the gates again, but crossing users continued passing through the gate until the attendant left the cabin and directly intervened to close the gate.

The driver of the train approaching from around a bend in the track saw the people on the crossing and applied the train’s emergency brake and sounded the horn. By the time the train reached it, the crossing was clear of pedestrians.

Network Rail carries out regular inspections and risk assessments of level crossings. It considers Farnborough North footpath crossing to be a high-risk location because approaching train drivers have a limited view of the crossing, which has a high number of daily users and a history of safety incidents.

Ten years ago, Network Rail installed extra ‘back-to-back’ miniature warning lights to help users to make safe decisions about crossing. Network Rail subsequently provided a crossing attendant and lockable gates, to improve the management of risk until it could install a footbridge and permanently close the crossing.

However, RAIB’s investigation found that Network Rail had not developed a plan or training to support the crossing attendant in effectively managing the risks that remained at the crossing following the introduction of the lockable gates. The investigation also found that Network Rail’s plan to build an accessible footbridge had not received planning approval over a prolonged period, because of land ownership issues and the need to design a compliant structure which was suitable for the constrained site.

Recommendations

RAIB has made two recommendations to Network Rail:

• improvements in the risk assessment process for footpath level crossings where there is a history of safety incidents, and
• formalising competency requirements for temporary and interim crossing attendants.

RAIB has also identified a learning point for railway organisations, reminding them that complex projects, or those requiring engagement with external stakeholders over an extended period, require managerial continuity.

The full report can be read here.

Andrew Hall, Chief Inspector of Rail Accidents said: “This incident was particularly serious because it involved large numbers of school and college students crossing the railway on a footpath crossing, ahead of a train travelling at speed. A serious accident was probably avoided due to the quick thinking of the crossing attendant who, on realising the danger, ran to intervene directly by closing a crossing gate that the students were holding open for each other.

“Behind the incident was an issue of the type RAIB has seen before. Historically the railway knew of the risks at this crossing and ongoing efforts were being made to replace it with a footbridge. This was proving time consuming and difficult, as is sometimes the case when planning decisions are involved. In the meantime, additional warning lights were installed, and a crossing attendant was provided to remotely control electromagnetic locks on the gates, thereby reducing risk. However, a known residual risk was that the crossing’s users might not respond correctly when the audible alarm and warning lights were activated by an approaching train. In this case people held open the gates for each other as the train approached, meaning the attempted application of the gate locks by the attendant had no effect.

“If a known level of residual risk is allowed to persist for a long time, the chances of it manifesting itself as an accident or serious incident will inevitably rise. This is what happened at Farnborough North and is why the incident holds a powerful lesson.”